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Answer:

It is a governing concept of the NSC that its activities will not be limited merely to areas of agency agreement and that the Council, on its own initiative, will seek out areas of agency conflict or omission to act, so as to permit presentation of alternative or new courses of action for Presidential decision. Under the present Administration the NSC process has been explicitly designed to assure that divergent views are presented to the President and that resultant guidance is relevant and forthright. The NSC Planning Board, for example, is explicitly directed to identify possible alternatives in the formulation of policy recommendations and to avoid undesirable compromises which conceal or gloss over real differences. Such differences, if they cannot be resolved, are reported to the Council and are neither suppressed nor compromised. More than half the policy statements which are sent to the Council from the Planning Board contain split views, largely on important issues on which one or more of the NSC agencies has indicated a strong divergence of opinion. For example, a recent paper dealing with a fundamental policy contained 19 splits when it was sent to the Council from the Planning Board and required five successive Council meetings before final approval.

Question:

Others urge that the NSC process be more closely geared to the budgetary process. It is held that the two now go forward essentially independently of each other, and that budgetary decisions taken outside the Council framework often negate or change the intent of NSC policy papers.

Answer:

Budgetary decisions are designed to reflect Presidential decisions, whether taken in the NSC or elsewhere. It is, of course, within the prerogative of a President to make a decision which supersedes one made earlier by him; what is imperative is that when a decision is made he have available to him all information relevant to the problem. It should be noted that the present Administration has adopted a policy of requiring that all NSC papers have appendices which clearly spell out the financial implications of the proposed policies.

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Question: Some urge giving more formal recognition in NSC deliberations to the primary role of the Secretary of State in national security policy formulation.

Answer: The Council is a corporate body, composed of individuals advising the President in their own right rather than representatives of their respective departments and agencies. Their function should be to seek, with their background of experience, the most statesmanlike solution to the problems of national security, rather than to reach solutions which represent merely a compromise of departmental positions. In actuality, of course, initial drafts of most policy papers reviewed by the NSC are prepared by the Department of State. All policy papers reviewed by the NSC reflect the written views of the Department of State, either through acquiescence in the paper or through explicit suggestions for alternative language. The President, however, must have complete freedom to select those courses of action he believes most appropriate and should not be denied -- as the proposal suggests -- full opportunity to consider the views of his other Council members. As President Eisenhower pointed out in a recent press conference (February 17, 1960), it is his desire that every member of the NSC be "just as free to express his opinion as a man can be," and that "nobody is barred from bringing up any fear or any matter, any preoccupation on his mind, any anxiety or conviction."

Question: Some propose encouraging debate on more sharply defined issues by giving departments or ad hoc task forces more opportunity to present policy drafts directly to the NSC.

Answer: The NSC now follows a practice of asking departments or ad hoc task forces to prepare materials for direct presentation to the Council. "Debate on more sharply defined issues" is not in itself encouraged, however, merely by giving departments or task forces more opportunity to present policy drafts directly to the NSC. Sharply defined issues are best debated if alternative courses of action are presented for discussion, as is the case in papers developed through the Planning Board mechanism, which permits each member department or agency to place before the President precisely the language it wishes against whatever background of common agreement has been reached. To the extent that special reports are called

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for from various departments and agencies, the present process normally permits them to be reviewed by the Planning Board, which makes it possible for divergent points of view to be sought, debated, and presented to the Council simultaneously with the basic report. The process also assures ample opportunity for study of the issues, in advance, by those who are to attend the Council meeting.

Question: Still others suggest changing the composition of the NSC and the Planning Board toward the end of giving greater weight to the views of the State and Defense Departments.

Answer: If the President is to have the benefit of all relevant points of view in making a decision affecting the national security, it is necessary that all responsible agencies have an opportunity to present their recommendations to him. The weight which the President assigns to the views of the Departments of State and Defense when they are at variance with other agencies is necessarily a matter to be kept to the discretion of the President rather than to be determined by an arbitrary formula. In any event, the ultimate decision is that of the President.

Question: Others propose making greater use of "discussion papers" to encourage wide-ranging and penetrating exploration of critical policy issues.

Answer: During the past year the NSC has made considerably greater use of "discussion papers" designed to outline alternative courses of action. The NSC staff is under explicit instructions to make a continuing examination of the totality of national security policies with a view to determining whether gaps exist which should be filled and whether important current issues and the policy implications of anticipated developments are being adequately explored. It is normally imperative, however, that the "discussion papers" be later followed by "policy papers" designed to outline with precision agreed objectives and courses of action.

Question: Some suggest substantially or modestly increasing the size of the NSC staff, with particular reference to broadening the base of scientific and military competence.

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Answer: It is agreed that the NSC staff should be comprised of individuals of high competence with a substantial background in matters related to U.S. security interests. However, it is believed responsible agencies should provide technical competence and guidance and that it should not be necessary to layer over agency responsibilities in such fields. Provided continued care is exercised in selecting NSC staff members, it is not now believed expansion of the staff is necessary.

Question: Others propose improving the monitoring function of the OCB, by concentrating its activities on a narrower front of key problems.

Answer: Under present arrangements implementation of all NSC papers is monitored either by the OCB or by appropriate agencies, the assignment depending on the scope of the decision involved. If we begin with the premise that it is desirable to arrange such follow-up action, then either the OCB must be responsible for all follow-up not readily assignable to an agency or agencies, or a new organization comparable to the OCB would need to be created to cover certain activities no longer the responsibility of the OCB. This would not appear appropriate nor is it apparent OCB operations would be improved by concentration on a narrower range of problems. In actuality, the usefulness of the OCB is enhanced by present instructions which permit the OCB, by agreement among the participating agencies, to advise and assist in the coordination of inter-agency operating matters separate and apart from specific policies assigned to it by the President for coordination. The recent designation, as Chairman of the OCB, of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who is also Chairman of the NSC Planning Board) should be very helpful in assuring the consistency of OCB actions with those of the NSC.

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Question: What are the merits and shortcomings of moves to shift the "center of gravity" in planning toward the Presidential level?

Answer:

Merits of this proposal include assurance that no single department will take precipitous action and that all relevant points of view are considered in the process of policy development. On the other hand, there would be organizational layering and perhaps overstaffing, as well as a potential danger of failure to assess operating realities unless appropriate departments were given full opportunity to participate in the making of policies which they would later be expected to carry out.

Question:

What observations are appropriate concerning the problem of organizational arrangements for staff assistance in the national security area?

Answer:

As pointed out in the Committee Report, each President needs great freedom to adapt his office and procedures to his own nature and experience. He should, therefore, have maximum possible discretion in organizing national security policy-making machinery and in organizing and

staffing the Executive Office. Under current circumstances the present organizational arrangements for staff assistance in the national security area are considered eminently satisfactory.

### III. THE KEY DEPARTMENTS: STATE AND DEFENSE

Question: Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments in national security policy-making now correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are needed?

Answer: In general, the responsibilities of the Departments of State and Defense in national security policy-making now appear to be correctly defined and divided.

Question: Should the Secretary of State be formally charged with more responsibility in connection with our defense posture and the defense budget?

Answer: Our defense posture and our defense budget reflect national security policies in whose development the Secretary of State has participated fully. No additional responsibility would appear warranted.

Question: Should the Secretary of State be asked to testify in the Congress concerning foreign policy implications of the defense budget?

Answer: The President has the Constitutional responsibility of advising the Congress from time to time as to the State of the Union. The annual State of the Union Message, the Budget Message, the Economic Report, and other special messages provide frequent opportunities for the President to apprise Congress as to the nation's posture in defense and other matters. The Congress is undoubtedly entitled to ask appropriate witnesses to testify on bills which come before it; whether the Secretary of State would be in position to provide information additional to that made available in the State of the Union Message or by other messages or witnesses appears questionable, particularly when it is recalled that the Secretary of State -- through the NSC process -- will have joined in recommending the defense budget to the President.

Question: Would it be desirable to create a "super-Secretary of State" who would be responsible for the over-all direction of foreign affairs, and who might have under him additional Secretaries of Cabinet rank for such areas as diplomacy, information and foreign economic matters?



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Answer:

No. Diplomacy and foreign economic matters are, however, appropriate fields of responsibility for Under Secretaries of State. With respect to information, George Allen, Director of the USIA, testified some time ago to the conviction that he was better able to speak out effectively in connection with the formation of foreign policy as the head of an independent agency than as an Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the same operation. Participation in the NSC, he pointed out, provided him with an opportunity to be heard in the highest circles of government, an opportunity which would have been lacking if the USIA were merely an element of the State Department. Furthermore, he pointed out, his opportunities for discussion with the Secretary of State were undoubtedly enhanced by his position as the head of an independent agency; this, he believed, provided him with a much greater opportunity to influence decisions, or at least to see that the public relations aspects of decisions were taken into consideration than if he had been an officer of the State Department.

Question:

Would it be desirable to create a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsible to the Secretary of State, who could represent the United States at Foreign Ministers' meetings?

Answer:

This would not appear practicable. The proposed position would be comparable to that of an Ambassador-at-Large -- not that of a Foreign Minister.

Question:

Would any other arrangements help, such as appointments of Ambassadors-at-Large?

Answer:

Depending on circumstances, the occasional appointment of Ambassadors-at-Large could be helpful.

Question:

What is the proper relationship between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and/or the Joint Staff of the JCS)? Should a representative of the Secretary of State participate in discussions of the JCS when appropriate?

Answer:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the Secretary of Defense. The proper relationships are between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and are basically the responsibility of the parties concerned. There would, however, appear to be no greater justification for a representative of the Department of State sitting with the JCS than there would be a representative of the Bureau of the Budget.

Question: Should a representative of the JCS sit with the Policy Planning Staff of State (and/or other State Department groups)?

Answer: There would appear to be no particular reason why a representative of the JCS should sit with the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and/or other internal State Department groups. The advice of the JCS is readily available to State through established channels.

Question: Is the responsibility of ISA now properly conceived? If not, what should it be?

Answer: The current responsibility of the ISA appears to be properly conceived.

Question: Should officials with more diverse backgrounds and experience be brought into the policy planning process in State and Defense?

Answer: From the point of view of the Bureau of the Budget, it would be extremely helpful if officials with financial backgrounds and experience were brought into the policy planning process in State and Defense.

Question: Is there need for a joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff?

Answer: For the planning and broad execution of national security policy it is deemed necessary to assure participation of all agencies represented in the National Security Council and the OCB. There are, however, undoubtedly instances related to policy execution which would be facilitated by consultation among fewer agencies. Such consultation is undoubtedly carried out at present.

Question: Can greater use be made of ad hoc interdepartmental task forces on special issues of national security policy?

Answer: It is believed maximum feasible use is now made of such committees. It is necessary, however, that all appropriate agencies be given an opportunity to review the resultant reports before final recommendations are made to the President.

Question: Is the proposed joint career service practical and worthwhile?

If so, how can it be administered so as to assure the selection of outstanding individuals and their assignment to areas where their skills can best be utilized?

What special problems might arise in integrating military officers into such a staff and how might they be solved?

Answer: No off-the-cuff answers to these questions are possible. A further study of the pros and cons is recommended.

#### IV. RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Question: Should State and Defense (and perhaps other agencies concerned with national security) participate fully in the initial establishment of "budgetary guidelines" for national security programs?

Answer: Overall budgetary guidelines must necessarily consider the totality of the nation's requirements, a process for which the Cabinet offers a more appropriate initial forum than the National Security Council. All principal agencies of the Government are thus afforded an opportunity to participate in the development of guidelines, although the final decision, of course, must be that of the President.

Question: Does the present length of the budgetary cycle discourage timely initiation of important new programs and encourage the continuation of old programs after they have outlived their usefulness? If so, what might be done to shorten the cycle?

Answer: The totality of funds included in the major national security budgets and the degree of administrative flexibility provided by law permit adequate opportunity to initiate new programs or discontinue old ones. Continuing care must be taken, however, to assure that programs are not frozen at the technical service level whether or not time or technology has overtaken the program.

Question: Should the budget be prepared in another form? Some maintain that, in its present form, the budget conceals policy alternatives of crucial importance rather than illuminating them. Such reforms as a functional budget for the armed services are proposed. Would this or similar changes be in order?

Answer: The President's budget is a program which results from a choice between policy alternatives and necessarily reflects decision rather than indecision. The Budget Message, however,

does provide an opportunity for discussion as to why a particular alternative was selected; in the FY 61 Budget Message, for example, an explicit explanation is given as to why particular decisions were made in regard to the B-70 program and a conventional aircraft carrier.

Further consideration of a functional budget for the Department of Defense is warranted, particularly as to the specific functional breakdown to be used. However, all appropriations would probably need to be made to the Secretary of Defense; the acquiescence of congressional committees in the revised arrangements would be desirable.

Question: Should there be advance preparation of alternative budgets for all major national security programs? Some wish to see one proposed budget at X dollars; another at perhaps 10 per cent below this level; and still another at perhaps 10 per cent above. Such a procedure, they hold, would permit policy-makers to see more clearly, and sooner, what is sacrificed and what is gained at various expenditure levels. Can and should this be done?

Answer: The proposal is worthwhile.

Question: Should the NSC process be more closely related to the budgetary process?

Answer: As noted earlier, the budget is designed to reflect Presidential decisions, whether made through the NSC or any other process. Under present arrangements, the NSC annually reviews the budgets for major national security programs to assure constancy with major national security policy. This procedure appears satisfactory.

Question: Some now feel the need for a fourth annual report from the President -- a Requirements and Resources Report. In broad outline, the report would have five main elements:

One: It would contain a statement of our over-all long-term strategy for national security.

Two: It would present, as a "package", our over-all long-term requirements for foreign policy, defense, and domestic programs affecting our world position, including a statement of program priorities.

Answer: It is agreed that science should be adequately represented in those areas where policy implies an science, so that scientific considerations may be incorporated in policy making. This relationship between science and the policy process has been recognized in recent years by the appointment of a Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (who is invited to attend all NSC and Cabinet meetings), by the creation of an active Science Advisory Committee to the President as a successor to the ODM Science Advisory Committee, by the creation of the Federal Council on Science and Technology, by the appointment of a science adviser to the Secretary of State, by extension of invitations to the Chairman of the AEC to attend NSC and Cabinet meetings, and, as is noted, by the general upgrading of the research and development function within the three services and the Department of Defense. Representatives of the National Science Foundation and National Aeronautics and Space Administration are also invited to participate in the NSC and Cabinet processes when appropriate. It is believed the above innovations afford ample opportunity for "flagging" crucial technical programs and speeding them to the highest decision-making levels.

Question: How, without straitjacketing technological development, can State and Defense furnish those concerned with development more useful guidance concerning the paths of technological exploration which might best enable us to further our overall political and military objectives?

Answer: There is nothing to preclude this right now.

Question: What institutional changes within the Department of State might help give political policy-makers a better understanding of the impact of research and development projects on the future of foreign policy?

Answer: The recent establishment of the position of Science Adviser to the Secretary was designed to prove of major assistance in this regard.

Question: What institutional changes within the Department of Defense might help give senior civilian officials and military officers a fuller awareness of the relationship between scientific developments and defense planning?

Answer: The recent establishment of the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering, with responsibility for the Defense Science Board and the Weapons System Evaluation Group, was designed to prove of major assistance in this regard. Further, each of the three service departments has either an Assistant Secretary or a Director for Research and Development.

Question: Would it be desirable, toward the end of closer joint scientific-political analysis and planning, to assign more scientists to positions in political areas, i.e., the Policy Planning Staff in State, or the Office of International Security Affairs in Defense?

Answer: Insofar as science and technology are concerned in the national security process, the mere addition of a scientist to a unit concerned with formulating or executing policy in which science plays only an indirect part would not of itself provide the sort of relationship contemplated. Even an active scientist cannot be versed in all fields of science, particularly with the highly specialized nature of scientific activities today. Scientific and technical advice must continue to come from the men working in the various scientific fields. It would appear most desirable, as has been done, to assure the participation of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology in NSC and Cabinet discussions.

Question: Would joint scientific-political planning at early stages in the decision-making process also be promoted by assigning more political and military planners to posts in technical areas?

Answer: See answer immediately above.

Question: Is there a need for raising the prestige and status of scientific advice within the Department of State?

Answer: More time is necessary adequately to assess the role of the Science Adviser to the Secretary and of the scientific attache program.

Question: What is the best relationship between science and technology in State and Defense, on the one hand, and scientific advice at the Presidential level, on the other?

Answer: The present system appears to work satisfactorily.

VI. "THINK GROUPS": WHAT IS THEIR CONTRIBUTION?

Specific suggestions made so far include the following:

Question: A "White House RAND" making studies for the President's national security staff and/or the National Security Council.

Answer: The report notes that policy research must not be confused with policy making. If it is accepted that the actions of the Executive Branch will normally be determined within that Branch and not by external agencies, it will be reasonably obvious why it is both desirable and time-saving to assure that executive agencies participate from their initiation in major national security studies and that the studies not be made by groups unable to root their conclusions in operating realities.

The experience of the past several years has indicated substantial "in house" competence for such studies in the Government; from this point of view there would appear to be no necessity for a special "White House RAND" to make studies on behalf of the NSC. Actually, as is the case at present, consultants of the highest stature can and are brought in to assist in the development of studies or to review existing policies.

Question: A "think group" for the State Department.

Answer: It is recognized that the Department of State, along with other departments of the Government, should be in position to seek outside advice on any of the policy areas for which it has responsibility. How such advice is used is, of course, a matter for the judgment of Department officials.

Question: An organization jointly sponsored by State and Defense.

Answer: As has been noted earlier, interdepartmental problems -- by and large -- are best solved in forums including all major departments. Other than for purely operational matters, it is doubtful that a joint State-Defense research organization would have a broad enough base to command substantially more attention than one responsive to a single department.

Question: A group working for all the Executive Branch departments and agencies concerned with national security.

Answer: As noted above, it is doubtful that any group responsible to a congeries of departments would see adopted proposals to which major departments took exception. The more desirable course would be to place in the agencies from the beginning whatever policy problems were deemed to require study. In this connection there has been as yet no determination of compelling need for a new organization to initiate or to carry out policy research projects. A wide range of research is being carried out by government departments and agencies, by institutions under contract to the Government, by many of the universities, and by private organizations. If the product of these efforts is not adequate to the needs of the Government, it is not because the facilities and organization do not exist. There would undoubtedly be merit, however, in making the end products of such studies more broadly available to other government agencies than appears to be the case at the present time.

Question: A similar group responsible to the Congress.

Answer: The merits of the proposal are not clear. Neither is it clear that the judgments of such a group would necessarily have any significant effect on Executive action.

Question: To the extent that the development of semi-autonomous policy research organizations is desirable, which departments or agencies could best profit from their services? The State Department? The National Security Council? State-Defense under a joint sponsorship arrangement?

Answer: Other than in unusual circumstances, it is not believed that available evidence confirms the necessity of such organizations except as they might directly serve individual departments.

Question: Are there any special difficulties in using such organizations at the White House level?

Answer: As indicated earlier, there are difficulties in using such organizations at any level above that of individual department and agencies.

Question: Should we try to build on the resources of existing organizations such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, and expand their charters?



Answer: This would be a matter for decision by interested agencies.

Question: Insofar as there is a problem of unequal standards in pay and prestige between such organizations and policy research within the government, how can this best be handled?

Answer: It is doubtful that individuals responsible for the development of national security policy could or should be categorized in such fashion as to permit them to be treated differently from other Government employees in the matter of salaries. The problem, therefore, will need to be treated in the context of the totality of Government personnel proposals. In this connection the President has proposed to the Congress a review of all compensation systems in the three branches of the Federal Government, directed toward adoption of an equitable employee compensation policy.

Question: Are there better methods for stimulating and making use of policy research in important problem areas at universities and individual study centers?

Answer: None are known.

Question: What steps would encourage more productive policy research within the government, with particular reference to the State Department and the defense establishment?

Answer: Since such research is the responsibility of agency heads, the several departments and agencies would be better fitted to discuss this problem. However, it is not clear that present research is inadequate.

#### VII. BETTER POLICY MAKERS

Question: Almost all authorities agree that inadequate compensation is a primary cause of our inability to secure and retain better key officials. Few propose that governmental salaries be brought to industrial levels, but almost all recommend a narrowing of the gap. They note in passing that the gradual but steady rise in university salaries holds forth the prospect that the salaries of key government officials may soon compare unfavorably with top positions in the academic community.

What recommendations are appropriate to meet this problem?

Answer: It is doubtful that individuals responsible for the development of national security policy could or should be categorized in such fashion as to permit them to be treated differently from other Government employees in the matter of salaries. The problem, therefore, will need to be treated in the context of the totality of Government personnel proposals. In this connection the President has proposed to the Congress a review of all compensation systems in the three branches of the Federal Government, directed toward adoption of an equitable employee compensation policy.

Question: As a general rule, how long should a person serve in a top policy-making position in order to learn the job and begin to make significant contributions?

Answer: Much depends on whether the individual is brought into the position from outside the Government or is promoted from within. The illustration given regarding the offices of Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense is, for example, somewhat misleading, since, as in the case of Secretary Gates, one individual may have filled both positions. Very roughly, however, an individual brought into a position regarding which he has had no previous experience would probably require six months familiarization; an individual promoted from the position of Deputy would require far less.

Question: Should a nominee be asked by the appropriate Senate Committee to give assurance that he intends to serve at least such a minimum period?

Answer: It would be perfectly appropriate for a congressional committee to question a nominee as to his intentions with respect to his service in the Government, but since a nominee is appointed to serve the President, the assurances should be between the President and the nominee. By and large, what is satisfactory to the President should be acceptable to congressional committees.

Question: Could a contribution be made by a "sense of the Senate" resolution expressing concern with this problem?

Answer: The President has an obvious concern and interest in the problem, as well as responsibility for its solution. It is not clear how he would be helped by a Senate resolution.

Question: Would substantial salary increases be helpful? If so, what level must be attained in order to make such action effective?

Answer: It is doubtful that individuals responsible for the development of national security policy could or should be categorized in such fashion as to permit them to be treated differently from other Government employees in the matter of salaries. The problem, therefore, will need to be treated in the context of the totality of Government personnel proposals. In this connection the President has proposed to the Congress a review of all compensation systems in the three branches of the Federal Government, directed toward adoption of an equitable employee compensation policy.

Question: How can a better climate be created in the business community for their executives doing a "tour of duty" in government?

Answer: The answer should probably be sought from the business community.

Question: Do the conflict of interest regulations prevent many outstanding executives from serving in government positions? If so, how can they be amended so that the individual is not unduly penalized, while the government is being protected?

Answer: Amendment of the regulations to require disclosure -- rather than divestment -- of holdings would appear helpful.

Question: Would permanent undersecretaries be desirable in the national security field?

Answer: No. It is imperative that key policy makers be responsive to the authority of the President; the proposal for permanent undersecretaries would undercut this authority. When administrations change, however, it is desirable -- as was true in 1953 -- that selected officials of the previous administration remain for a few months to provide continuity in key positions in the national security area. Basically, continuity is provided by permanent career staffs.

Question: If so, in what particular departments or agencies?

Answer: Not applicable.

Question: Should a major effort be made to improve formal training at various levels for selected Foreign Service and other civilian employees, including additional opportunities to attend university graduate schools?

Answer: Recent changes in legislation gave agencies substantially more flexibility in this regard than has been true in the past. This new experience should be evaluated before any further changes are made.

Question: If so, how might the Executive Branch and Congress best concert their efforts to this end?

Answer: Not applicable.

Question: Should opportunities be increased for cross-fertilization of ideas and experience in joint political-military-scientific training programs, including greater civilian participation in the various war colleges?

Answer: No objection.

Question: Would it be desirable to establish some new study institution, perhaps sponsored jointly by State and Defense and related agencies, offering training beyond the National War College level for a limited number of senior officials?

Answer: This seems doubtful. The educational curriculum at the National War College can be set at any desired level.

Question: Many have raised questions concerning the present length of tours of duty of military officers and civilian officials. They cite the progressively longer period required to master job requirements in many fields, particularly where technical or specialist problems are involved. They note approvingly the gradual trend toward longer tours of duty, but believe that further action in this direction is required.

What corrective action is in order?

Answer: It is believed there are still too many military and civilian tours of duty, particularly overseas, of less than two years in duration. These should be lengthened, recognizing, of course, the necessity for changes in top-level positions at the time of changes of administrations.